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Custom and Right. By Sir Paul Vinogradoff. Cambridge, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1925. pp. 109.
This small book in pamphlet form is but a fragment to show that the
facts and ideas that are called legal can be studied with advantage from
the same viewpoint as other branches of social phenomena, such as lan-
guage, religion, folklore or customs, that are not legal. While all the other
sciences that are called social have been almost transformed, some of them
practically created, by scientific study, the law, which is the most social of
them all because it has to do with rules of conduct of such importance that
they are made imperative, has remained so far as scientific study is con-
cerned, wholly untouched except in the most superficial manner. This treat-
ment leads to generalizations that are often baseless. Lawyers as a class
have always been seemingly impervious to any study of law except as a
reasoning from text to text or from precedent to precedent. As a conse-
quence rules of law, cumbersome and promotive of injustice, have survived
long after the reason for them has ceased. Whenever a court has ven-
tured on historical research in the law, almost without exception the legal
history adduced has been laughable. In fact, until late years there has
never been an adequate history of the English law.
When we come to a general philosophy of law, writers are still chopping
the old and worthless chaff of what they call the analytical or the historical
or the jus naturale school, which have been the work of men not lawyers.
They go on classifying, reclassifying, subdividing and resubdividing the
writers upon legal philosophy and their conceptions, which have never had
the slightest influence on the actual development of law. Kant's or Hegel's
philosophies of law which are merely philosophies of right, with the term
used ambiguously,---this pale moonshine of metaphysics which never had
scientific reality,-or theories of the divine origin of law or of its historical
growth, or dicta of the school which bases law not on what it is, but on some
assumed power that created it, are still the stuff on which legal philo-
sophical dreams are made. We have the tangled metaphysics of Kohler,
the rigid, logical deductions of the French or the practical makeshifts of
the English, seeking to do duty as legal philosophy.
What has always been needed is scientific study. That study asks for
facts and facts alone, unclouded by hasty generalizations. As soon as a
science has facts, the philosophers can construct their philosophy, but a
philosophy of a science where the facts are not ascertained can be per-
formed by a metaphysician or a logician who assumes an a priori system
or a set of general principles. Granted the premises, which are non-exis-
tent, the rest of it is an easy deduction. This is why no legal philosopher
has ever been suspected of being a jurist.
Now this book suggests a better plan, which will not be popular because it
involves hard work in ascertaining facts. But in the end the scientific
method is bound tq prevail. That method requires the study of social
phenomena called law, not the study of what some inadequately informed
person has said about those phenomena. In Herbert Spencer's Sociotogy,
the part devoted to justice is grotesque. It is a borrowing from others
whom he supposed to be generalizing on sound premises, but what is jus-
tice, or supposed to be justice at any time, is the most difficult thing to
explain in all social phenomena. Any generalizing upon it is useless.
Kant's celebrated solution that, law is a system of rules devised on the
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principle of giving to each individual the fullest liberty consistent with a
like liberty in others, is, as a working principle to explain law at any given
time, utterly useless. Yet almost everything adduced has some relevancy
on some point.
This study of legal phenomena must be comparative in space among co-
existent systems, and comparative in time as shown by progression of one
stage of law to another. The material is co-extensive with the whole prog-
ress from mere brutes living in a social state to our highest civilizations.
It involves comparisons among legal systems at different stages of either
progression or decay. Yet all the time the main effort should be to avoid
generalizing. Much of this I have stated is implicit and assumed in the
book under review.
The first chapter is called Methods of Jurisprudence, showing the manner
in which law develops, sometimes in one way, sometimes in another. Warn-
ings against the hasty methods of Maine or of Post or of false analogies
like those of Ihering or Leist in different spheres are adduced. Final re-
sults even in enlightened systems depend on "cross-currents, transitions and
compromises between heterogeneous factors." But the point made is to
work and study out the factors, in order to find why any particular rule
exdsts as law.
The next chapter deals with the particular factors of custom and legisla-
tion. It examines, without dogmatizing, the difference between the grad-
ual acceptance of law by means of custom and the conscious, purposeful
statement of a law by the law-making power. The next chapter tahes a
particular instance of the family organization as a fertile source of law in
different stages. Finally the last chapter, entitled The Right of Appropria-
tion, carries the discussion into the origins of property and the clashing
interests of the individual in his freedom to acquire and to contract as
against the interests of the social organization. It is all in the easy method
of a wise man talking, as if lecturing, upon topics, not seeking to exhaust,
but to suggest.
This book is stimulating. It will bear reading and rereading. Like all
good books, it suggests more than it says. The best thing about it is that
when one of those gentlemen who is seeking to avoid thought and work sits
down with his note book to copy out some hard and fast rule, he will be
baffled. As to that merit of giving dogmatic rules, if it is a merit in any
book, Lord Melbourne's remark about the Order of the Garter to his some-
what dazed Queen is strictly in point: "The best thing about the Order
is that it has no damned nonsense of merit about it."
People who talk about Kohler being a great jurist will not realize what
a loss to jurisprudence Vinogradoff's death has been. He had under way
another volume of his historical legal writing to be devoted to that most
difficult period lasting from the ruin of the Western Roman Empire to the
end of the Dark Ages. It would have been the work of a great legal
scholar, certainly the greatest in the last fifty years in any land. One is
appalled to think of how much work this jurist did. Merely his prepara-
tion by equipment in the languages was enough for one lifetime. A Rus-
sian who left the University of Moscow to live in England, he wrote Eng-
lish like a native with purity and precision. He was an ex\pert on the
manuscripts. His discovery of Bracton's Note Book is one of the roman-
ces of the law. His book on Greek law showed a mastery of the Greek
philosophers, orators and historians on legal matters. In the Roman law
he could correct the errors of Ihering. Latin was to him almost a native
tongue. In modern languages, German, French, Italian and the Scandi-
navian, he was an adept. In England he became the greatest authority
on the old mediaeval common law. His writing on villeinage from a legal
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and social standpoint made that subject his own field. He gained the high-
est legal distinction, the Corpus professorship. He had mastered the Ger-
man, French and Italian legal writing. He reminds one of the surpassingly
wide learning of a Cujas, a Casaubon or a Scaliger. He could have argued
a case with Lysias on Athenian law, or have been of help to Tribonian in
compiling the Corpus Juris of Justinian, or told Bracton how to reconcile
his common law with the Roman law of the Glossators. He could have lec-
tured after Irnerius on the Roman texts at Bologna. He could have
discussed with Cujas his reconstruction of Ulpian. He could have pointed
out to Coke his numberless errors in the early English law. Yet he could
illuminate his learning by the latest cases in the English courts. And just
as he had reached his most effective years his death came "to remind us,
what shadows we are and what shadows we pursue."
JOHN I. ZANE
Chicago, Ill.
Sources and Literature of English Law. By W. S. Holdsworth. With a
Foreword by the Right Honorable Lord Justice Atkin. New York, Ox-
ford University Press, American Branch, 1925. pp. 247.
This book is based on a series of lectures delivered by the author at the
request of the Council of Legal Education in 1924.
We wish that Dr. Holdsworth had chosen a different title. "Sources" and
"Literature," especially when applied to the subject of law and to a some-
what ancient period of our history, have such an ominous sound to so many
ears that the title hardly conveys any idea of the form and spirit of this
work. Here are no long lists of ancient books, no mere massing of facts
about books. We have instead a straightforward, orderly, and intensely
interesting account of various types of records, reports and treatises, and
of their respective importance and influence in the general field of our legal
development. We are introduced not only to the written sources themselves,
but to the men, the individual men, who produced them and first used them.
This human element which runs through the book, coupled with the lack of
anything antiquarian or pedantic, gives a vividness and freshness to these
pages that one would hardly anticipate from the title.
On the subject matter no comment need be made-not even in regard to
the hitherto too little understood subjects considered in the last two chap-
ters under the general heading of "Developments outside of the Common
Law." Fundamentally much, if not most,' of what we have here has already
appeared in the History of English Law, references to which, for further
information on the various topics treated of, are given at the end of each
chapter in this more recent book. But the form and general presentation
of the material is new. Within the limits of a comparatively few pages
the writer has succeeded in compressing the history of English legal litera-
ture for more than six centuries-from the time of the Norman Conquest
till the end of the eighteenth century. This compression has been skillfully
done. The reader is spared both a mass of details and mere generalities;
there is a good balance of proportion and perspective; no one period or
subject is emphasized at the expense of any other.
The book "is intended for students who are beginning to read law." Its
usefulness can not be limited by such narrow bounds; all whose interest is
primarily in things legal should be included among those who will be bene-
fited by reading it.
GEORGE E. WOODBINE
Yale University, School of Law.
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Sumptuary Legislation and Personal Reg iation in Englad. By Franccz
Elizabeth Baldwin. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1926. pp. 273.
This social-legal study, like Professor Kent R. Greenfield's Snm ptay
Law in Ngirnberg, is much too timely and enlightening a contribution to
remain long in the forbidding confines of the usual Ph.D. thesis. For it
might well be perused by him who ponders the principles of malmn pro-
hibitumn or who essays the question: When may legitimate individual be-
havior become a social wrong serious enough to justify paternalistic state
inhibition?
Beginning with the earliest known sumptuary laws enacted by the Eng-
lish Parliament in the 14th Century, personal legislation is traced through
the Lancastrian and Yorkist periods to its zenith under Queen Elizabeth
and to its decline in 1604 under James I. These early regulations proposed
to control not only food and drink, but likewise the use of certain practical
commodities, the number of guests at weddings, the use of cosmetics and
the manner of personal dress. They even crept into international affairs
in the instance of the treaty providing for the marriage of King Louis of
France to Princess Mary of England, sister of Henry VIII. Furthermore,
many of the acts blend with early attempts at price-fixing, regulation of
weights and measures, protection of pure foods and beverages, and preser-
vation of peace and order. Consequently the book affords historical per-
spective for an objective consideration of the Volstead Act, the -National
Net Weight Law, and the Food, and Drugs Statutes.
Among the motives for the strictly sumptuary legislation in England,
Dr. Baldwin mentions: "(1) The desire to preserve class distinctions,
so that any stranger could tell by merely looking at a man's drezs to what
rank in society he belonged; (2) the desire to check practices which were
regarded as deleterious in their effects, due to the feeling that luxury
and extravagance were in themselves wicked and harmful to the morals of
the people; (3) economic motives; (a) the endeavor to encourage home
industries and to discourage the buying of foreign goods, and (b) the at-
tempt on the part of the sovereign to induce his people to save their money,
so that they might be able to help him out financially in time of need."
To this is added sheer conservatism and dislike of new fashions. There
were doubtless other causes which Dr. Baldwin does not stress, e.g., guild
standardization and community co5peration for public health which ap-
parently obtained both in England and on the Continent during the Middle
Ages-according to Dr. A. W. Blythe's Foods, Their Compo siWbn amu
Aizalysis. But in revealing indulgences which English sumptuary regula-
tions strived to curb, many pages are consumed, which would be of more
interest to devotee of the Woman's Home Companion than to jurists.
Lurid pen pictures glide before the reader, detailing the trousseau of the
prioress in the Canterbury Tales, the originality or aboriginality of medie-
val ladies' sartorial daring, the grace or disgrace of misses' hairbobbing,
and other delicate touches of gentlewomen's coiffure too intimate for legal
comprehension.
The territorial jurisdiction of these English sumptuary laws is con-
trasted with those of Central Europe in that "The English ordinances were
national rather than local in character, and dealt with fewer subjects than
did those of other countries." For instance the "cities of the Rhine country
assumed all the functions of government, and ruled their few citizens in a
more strict and intimate fashion than the King of England was able to
do in his wider dominions. Their records contain materials which are not
found in English towns," as had already been indicated in Professor Green-
field's study of Nfirnberg, and in Dr. Blythe's work.
The problem of enforcing sumptuary legislation in England evidentir
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devolved upon the courts, local officers, sheriffs, knights, coroners, assessors
of victuals and corn, lords of manors, and the parliamentarians themselves
in contrast to some modern American legislators. As early as 1287 certain
persons were convicted by the fair court of St. Ives for having used false
measures. One statute required the mayor and bailiffs of London to in-
quire into the illegal sale of wines. Another required coroners to inquire
"of those who live riotously and continually haunting taverns." Several
cases of enforcement are reviewed, e.g. Claxton V. Everingham; and The
King v. Inge and Carrol. In 1363, after the Statute of Apparel was en-
acted the Chancellor "charged all the members of Parliament to abide by
this statute, to enforce it and cause it to be enforced, and not even to
attempt to do anything in any respect contrary to it. The commons, upon
their return home, were ordered to publish abroad the new regulations and
to make them known to all the people, so that in the future everyone should
dress, and make his household and servants dress, in accordance with the
ordinance." Considerable ordinance power seems to have evolved from
the discretion granted to enforcement officers, and in 1363 some members
of Parliament even suggested to the Chancellor that the results of their
deliberations be issued as ordinances rather than as statutes "so that they
might amend the same at their pleasure." They were so promulgated.
Church officials and guilds were also concerned in enforcement, and public
sentiment was sometimes appealed to by poets and satirists alike.
Despite these efforts, the Parliament repealed much sumptuary legislation
by the Act of 1604. "After its passage, not a single statute of apparel was
enacted, though occasional regulations of various kinds were issued in an
effort to curb extravagance. These grew fewer and fewer, however, as
the years passed by, until finally they disappeared altogether. The rea-
sons for this steady decline of interest in sumptuary legislation, one can,
in the absence of positive evidence on this point, only surmise." Dr. Bald-
win suggests several probable reasons, and is inclined to accept Montes-
quieu's conclusion that "manners and morals, like religion, lie outside the
range of human compulsion," and leaves undecided, as does Blackstone,
the "question how far private luxury is a public evil." She concludes her
thorough research with the further observation of Blackstone, that legis-
lators in England "have changed their sentiments on this point, as is
shown by the early evictment and the later repeal of sumptuary laws."
Yet one might ask if there is any causal relation between this decline of
sumptuary law administration and the rise of Puritanism, Quakerism, and
Methodism. And one might very well wish further enlightenment concerning
the actual methods and results of sumptuary law administration in Europe
and in America. Dr. Baldwin's monograph is not concerned chiefly with
this problem, which is the real test of legislation. Professor Greenfield's
study of such administration in Niirnberg was interrupted by the World
War. Authorities disagree as to the experience in America. It is to be
hoped that this complementary study will be supplied eventually.
MIMTON CoNovER
Yale University.
Cases on Agency. By Floyd R. Mechem. Second edition by Warren A.
Seavey. Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 1925. pp. xxvii, 845.
At the outset and by way of summation of the reviewer's judgment it
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may be said that this case book is an excellent piece of work. It is built by
Professor Seavey with much of the material used by Professor Mcchem in
his pioneer effort and a great deal more material in addition, though the
arrangement and structure are according to a different pattern.
The reviewer has been particularly interested in the chapter dealing
with the liability of the principal in tort. Professor Seavey's long experi-
ence in teaching Torts places him in a peculiarly advantageous position
to survey the field and to estimate the pedagogical value of the cases. The
results of this experience are manifest here. In this chapter the cases
are grouped into three sections: "In General," (pp. 352-450); "Liability
for Acts of Independent Contractors," (pp. 451-465); and "Reprezenta-
tions" (pp. 466-501). While he does not overlook the leading cases of the
earlier years of the development of the doctrine of respozdcat -uperior he
inclines to draw his material from the modern reports. For the greater
part, especially in section 1, the selections are from American courts. And
the cases, taken by and large, possess that virtue often mentioned in con-
nection with wit but also appropriate in case books, brevity. In this sec-
tion the student is introduced to the topic by the action of trover in the
pawnbrokers' case' (where Holt makes the pronouncement that "whoever
employs another, is answerable for him, and undertakes for his care to
all that make use of him,") and is led, sometimes by way of frolic and
occasionally on a detour, to the application of that doctrine in the trespass
action against a railroad2 for the wilful assault on a passenger by the
railroad's employee. Frequent footnotes are rich with collected cases;
leading articles from law reviews and other publications covering one
phase or another of the general problem under discussion are cited, e.g.,
pp. 352, 359, 408, 410, 421; but the expectant reader will be disappointed
if he looks for any sustained references to current editorial comment upon
or related to the several cases.
So much for a brief descriptive account of a sample section of the book.
As to the substance of the matter included there, if any criticism or sug-
gestion is in order it is, not so much on the ground that anything included
should have been omitted, but rather that something is omitted which
might well have been added. There seems to be an undue emphasis upon
the element of control for determining whether the relationship of master
and servant exists. It cannot be denied truthfully that the preponderant
language of the cases runs in terms of control, but there are nevertheless
some other cases 3 which indicate a definite desire and effort on the part
of at least a few courts to escape from the exclusiveness of control as a
test and to seek further indicia of the relationship as a basis upon which
to decide the cases. All courts seem to agree that control is a factor, but
some insist it is only a factor, one of the many which must be considered.
What those other factors are has been discussed elsewhere.6 The only
suggestion urged here is that the inclusion of one or two cases precenting
SJones v. Hart (1698) Holt, K. B. 642.
2 Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. (1869) 57 Me. 202.
3 Barrett v. Selden-Breck Construction Co. (1919) 103 Neb. 830, 174 N. W.
866; Braxton v. Mendelson. (1922) 233 N. Y. 122, 135 N. E. 193; Franksh V.
Carpenter (1922) 192 Iowa, 1398, 186 N. W. 647.
4Tiffany, Agency (Powell's 2d ed. 1924) see. 37; See Smith, Frolic ad




squarely that point of view would have been quite appropriate.; Moreover,
such cases might produce the desirable result of persuading the student to
make a more specific and searching inquiry into the economic basis upon
which respondeat superior is soundly rested.
NonL T. DOWinNG
Columbia University, School of Law.
A Manual of Roman Private Law. By W. W. Buckland. Cambridge, Eng-
land, Cambridge University Press, 1925. pp. xxvii, 432.
The present volume is a condensation of the author's larger work, A Text-
book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, published in 1921, to
meet the needs of beginners in Roman Law. It leaves out some of the
more controversial matters and much of the detail appearing in the Text-
book. It omits also all notes save occasional references to the Corpus Juris.
In outline and treatment it follows, with minor exceptions, the older work.
The Textbook aimed to be a practical treatise, setting forth the Roman
Law as a Roman lawyer might have done. One of the main objects of
the author was to purge the Roman Law found in the older treatises of all
modern concepts and doctrines which had crept into it and to free the classi-
cal law of the Byzantine influences which the interpolations by Tribonian
had introduced into the classical texts. Professor Buckland lays before the
reader the Roman Law from the time of Augustus to that of Justinian as
he finds it supported by specific texts. He does not indulge in speculation
nor embellishment. If the data are insufficient to support a rule, he says
so, and if he finds inconsistencies, he does not attempt to gloss them over.
In the Manual, the same descriptive method is used. No attempt is made
to develop the different topics from an historical, doctrinal, or comparative
point of view. This makes the book more difficult reading than the ordi-
nary institutional work on Roman Law. In common with the Textbook
it has the distinct merit, however, of giving to the reader a more realistic
picture of what the Roman private law actually was.
ERNEST G. LORENZEN.
Yale University, School of Law.
Lectures on Legal Topics, 1921-1922. Delivered before the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York. New York, The MacMillan Co,, 1925.
pp. 390.
Here is a wholesome and diverting volume, with as much diversity in
topic, tone and treatment as may be found in a modern radio program.
Fourteen leaders of the Bench and Bar have, in most instances, selected
their own subjects; always, the phases of it which they have developed and
discussed.
These lectures come hot from the workshops and battlefields of the law,
Scholarship and erudition they reflect, but in no academic aloofness. These
5 In the footnote on page 354 Professor Seavey inserts a quotation (from
Arnold v. Lawrence (1923) 72 Colo. 528, 213 Pac. 129) which approaches
this viewpoint as nearly as any matter noted by the reviewer. It should
be added that Standard Oil Company v. Anderson (1909) 212 U. S. 215,
29 Sup. Ct. 252, which is reprinted on page 370, is thought by some to
contain the viewpoint implicitly.
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discussions spring from the grass roots of day-by-day experience--"in
the field," as the engineers would call it.
Consequently these lectures breathe and reflect realism and sophistication,
and at the same time are faithful to the Anglo-Saxon passion for bettering
our methods of handling disputes. In addresses of this character, each
speaker is inclined to display almost evangelized zeal for his favorite thezes,
and the whole tendency is to surround the profession of jurisprudence with
an aura of exalted advocacy.
At the same time, one cannot read the pronouncements of Judge Cardozo,
of Judge Hough, of Learned and Augustus Hand, of Judge Swayze, or of
the various leaders of the profession, without feeling that the law has
made headway in America and has established an intellectual independ-
ence and vigor in seeking constant improvement in its own procezzes,
without sacrificing what is vital and basic. We no longer catch a delinea-
tion of a jurisprudence which, like Milton's lion, has been "paving to get
free its hinder parts"; a measure of the progress made might be found in
the comments elicited by the present volume, if compared with the judg-
ment pronounced upon the writings of lawyers in a pamphlet which found
extensive circulation in England, and the American colonies:1
"There was Law before Lawyers; there was a time when the Common
Customs of the Land were sufficient to secure M3cum and Tum. What has
made it since so difficult? Nothing but the Comments of Lawyer3 con-
founding the Text and writhing the Laws, like a Nose of Wax, to what
Figure best serves their purpose."
For bringing together the speakers whose addresses constitute this read-
able compilation, students of juridical progress are indebted to Mr. Guern-
sey Price, Chairman of the New York City Bar Association's Committee on
Conferences and Lectures, and to his associates in that active committee.
Although a majority of the lectures were delivered by judges and lawyers
resident within New York State, nearly all of their topics were of interest
as far-flung as Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. To the editorial members
of the Committee, I would suggest that future volumes, if equally replete
with working material, deserve an index as well as a "contents" page.
The address which immediately commanded widespread public attention
in this series was that of Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo of the New Yoe:
Court of Appeals, whose topic was "Progress in the Law: A Ministry of
Justice." His plea was for the early establishment of a permanent tribunal
which "would not only observe the workings of the law as administered
day by day," but "would enlighten itself constantly through all available
sources of guidance and instruction" and would work expertly, impartially
and unceasingly, for the accomplishment of conserving changes and the
defeat of unscientific and unsound innovations. This constructive recom-
mendation has not yet been enacted into law, but it is brought back: to
mind and presses for primary consideration, in. prhnciple, whenever
remedial legislation in this field is being formulated.
The ripe wisdom of the elder jurists permeates the pages of Judge
Hough's discussion of the review of criminal causes in the Federal Courts
1 A Discourse on the Rise and Power of Parliament (1677).
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and Judge Swayze's exposition of the need for improving the sources of
the law. Judge Learned Hand has persuasively brought together the
evidences of need for re-examination of some of the processes of proof
and concepts of evidence, in the light of present-day commercial conditions.
He calls attention to these deficiencies of the trial, without any buoyant
hope or inducement that a perfect judicial system may be devised and ad-
ministered by men actuated by the "fierce individualism" of today.
Virtually a volume within the volume is made up of the five lectures on
The New Civil Practice Act and Rules, the adoption of which by the State
of New York had caused considerable consternation to the senior practi-
tioners, in 1921. The author of this treatise on the new procedure was
Dean Carlos C. Alden, of the Law School of the University of Buffalo,
whose revisions and annotations of Abbott's Forms and other standard
practice works have given him high standing in this technical field. Dean
Alden's lectures were delivered within three months after the taking effect
of the new legislation, and pointed out numerous defects as well as ad-
vantages, which seemed to him to inhere in this laborious attempt to
simplify civil procedure in New York State. Although the lecturer at
that time spoke from a point of view not sufficiently detached from the
perplexities, the ambiguities, and the innovations, which had been the by-
products of the legislative consideration, he confessed, in his closing para-
graphs (in December of 1921):
"I have a growing respect for this Practice Act. I think it is going to
develop into a very useful innovation in many ways. It is some hardship
to us now to have what we know about the Code thrown aside, and to
have to rearrange our knowledge; but eventually I think we will be glad
for what has been done."
Many of the defects to which Dean Alden called attention in this series
of lectures were soon remedied by legislative action, as foot-notes in the
present edition point out.
The lamented Sir John W. Salmond, of the Supreme Court of New Zea-
land and the British delegation to the Washington Conference on the
Limitation of Armament, made an earnest plea for the simplification of
the modern law library and for official furtherance of the tasks of codifica-
tion which since have been so acceptably carried forward by the Ameri-
can Law Institute. Sir John's address on "The Literature of the Law"
is unrevised in this volume, because of his subsequent death. The erudition
of Hampton L. Carson of Philadelphia was reflected in his address upon
James Kent, compiled from unpublished letters and documents in Mr. Car-
son's possession, largely in the handwriting of New York's great Chan-
cellor and commentator, to whom Mr. Justice Stone has referred as "in
many respects the most gifted and attractive figure in the annals of
American jurisprudence."
A significant sketch of the development of constitutional law in America,
from the pragmatic point of view of a jurist who has dealt with the con-
stitutional questioris of the decade, was contributed by the Honorable
Augustus N. Hand, of the United States District Court. A similar serv-
ice as to "Canadian Constitutional Law" was performed by the eloquent
Charles J. Doherty, K. C., formerly Minister of Justice of the Dominion
of Canada and representative of the Dominion at Versailles and Geneva.
Henry M. Powell, of the New York Bar, discussed concretely the taxation
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of personal and corporate income in New York, and our benign and belovel
Willard Bartlett, formerly Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals,
charmed all of us with his informal account of that Court and its pred-
ecessors, in the course of which he "lifted the veil" and gave an impreZsive
view of the manner and spirit in which the conferences are held in that
great State tribunal of justice and leadership, which has lately been pre-
sided over by jurists of the eminence of Cullen, Willard Bartlett, and
Hiscock.
Perhaps characteristic of the sources of this volume is the fact that it
places first an exceedingly practical and controversial discussion of "next
steps in corporate reorganizations," based upon that cause cclbrc, Nortk-
enz Pacific Railway Company v. BoydA in the light of Circuit Judge Martin
T. Manton's opinion in the, tna Explosvec3 Company case 3 and other
decisions in that agitated arena of the law. The views of the Boyd ease,
presented by James N. Rosenberg in opening the subject, were vigorously
combatted by Allen Wardell and Robert T. Swaine, along lines which have
since been the theme of most animated arguments before the Courts.
If I were asked to select a "key" paragraph, to reflect the mood and
temper of most of this vital volume, it would be from the gifted pen of
Judge Cardozo:
"The time is ripe for betterment. 'La droit az scs 6poqvc ' says Pascal
in words which Professor Hazeltine has recently recalled to us. The law
has 'its epochs of ebb and flow.' One of the flood seasons is upon us. I'en
are insisting, as perhaps never before, that law shall be made true to its
ideal of justice. Let us gather up the driftwood, and leave the waters
pure."
New York City.
2 (1912) 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct 554.
3 Graseili Chemical Co. v. ,Etna Explosirves Co. (1913, C. C. A. 2d) 252
Fed. 456.
